

CRT-based Secret Sharing Schemes

Design and Security

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Outline

- 1 Introduction
- 2 CRT-based Secret Sharing Schemes
- 3 Security Properties
- 4 Extensions
- 5 Concluding Remarks

Secret Sharing Schemes

- 1979, Blakley and Shamir
- Secret sharing scheme:
 - secret space and dealer
 - participants and share spaces
 - access structure
- Security concepts:
 - perfectness
 - idealness
 - perfect zero-knowledge

Secret Sharing Schemes

Applications in cryptography and distributed computing:

- Byzantine agreement
- Secure multi-party computation
- Threshold and visual cryptography
- Access control
- Attribute-based encryption
- Generalized oblivious transfer
- etc.

Secret Sharing Schemes

- Construction techniques
 - Polynomial interpolation (univariate or bivariate interpolation)
 - Chinese Remainder Theorem (standard CRT, CRT in polynomial rings, interpolation and CRT in polynomial rings)
 - Graphs, matroids, lattices
 - Geometric constructions
- Classes of access structures:
 - Threshold
 - Unanimous consent
 - Weighted
 - Multilevel (conjunctive, disjunctive)
 - Compartmented (with lower or upper bounds)
 - Multisecret

Generic Construction for $(t + 1, n)$ -threshold Schemes

Parameter setup

- $m_0 < \dots < m_n$ sequence of co-primes
- possible various constraints on the sequence
- t, n, m_0, \dots, m_n are public parameters




Secret and share spaces

- $[\alpha, \beta)$, where α and β depend on the public parameters
- \mathbb{Z}_{m_i} , for all $1 \leq i \leq n$


Secret sharing and reconstruction

- $S_i = S' \bmod m_i$, for all $1 \leq i \leq n$, where S' is obtained from S in some way
- Any $t + 1$ distinct shares should allow an easy reconstruction of the secret

Instances: GRS, Asmuth-Bloom, Mignotte




Distributive Weighted Threshold Access Structures



Distributive weighted TAS are neither conjunctive nor disjunctive MAS

CRT-realization of DWTAS



ε -sequence of co-primes: $m_0 \cdot \max_{i,j} \{m_{i,j}^{t_i - \varepsilon}\} < \min_{i,j} \{m_{i,j}^{t_i}\}$

Asymptotic Security

- Loss of entropy: $\Delta(y_I) = H(X) - H(X|Y_I = y_I)$, where $y_I \in \prod_{i \in I} \mathbb{Z}_{m_i}$

- Asymptotic perfectness

- $H(X) \neq 0$
- $|\Delta(y_I)| \rightarrow 0$ as m_0 goes to infinity

- Information rate goes asymptotically to $r > 0$ if


$$\left| \frac{|\mathbb{Z}_{m_i}|}{|\mathbb{Z}_{m_0}|} - r \right| \rightarrow 0 \text{ as } m_0 \text{ goes to infinity}$$

- Asymptotic idealness : $r = 1$

- Perfect zero-knowledge : $\sum_{y_I \in \prod_{i \in I} \mathbb{Z}_{m_i}} \left| P(Y_{S,I} = y_I) - P(Y_{S',I} = y_I) \right| \rightarrow 0$ as m_0 goes to infinity

Compact Sequences of Co-primes

- **k -compact sequence of co-primes** : m_0, m_1, \dots, m_n such that
 - $m_1 < \dots < m_n$
 - $km_0 - m_0^\theta < m_i < km_0 + m_0^\theta$ for all $1 \leq i \leq n$ and some real number $k > 0$



- **Density** : $(x, x + x^\theta)$ contains compact sequences of co-primes whose length ℓ satisfies

$$\ell > \ell(x, \theta) + \left\lceil \sum_{i=2}^k \frac{2ix^{\theta/i}}{5 \log(x + x^\theta)} \right\rceil$$

$$\ell(x, \theta) = \pi(x + x^\theta) - \pi(x) > \frac{2x^\theta}{5 \log(x + x^\theta)}$$

Security of the GRS Threshold Scheme

Theorem 1

Let $k \geq 1$ be a real number. The GRS threshold scheme, under the uniform distribution on the secret space, is asymptotically perfect and its information rate goes asymptotically to k if and only if it is based on k -compact sequences of co-primes.

Corollary 2

The GRS threshold scheme, under the uniform distribution on the secret space, is asymptotically ideal if and only if it is based on 1-compact sequences of co-primes.

Theorem 3

Let $k \geq 1$ be a real number. The GRS threshold scheme based on k -compact sequences of co-primes, under the uniform distribution on the secret space, is perfect zero-knowledge.

Security of the Asmuth-Bloom Threshold Scheme

Theorem 4

Let $k \geq 1$ be an integer. The Asmuth-Bloom threshold scheme, under the uniform distribution on the secret space, is asymptotically perfect and its information rate goes asymptotically to k if and only if it is based on k -compact sequences of co-primes.

Corollary 5

The Asmuth-Bloom threshold scheme is asymptotically ideal with respect to the uniform distribution on the secret space if and only if it is based on 1-compact sequences of co-primes.

Theorem 6

Let $k \geq 1$ be an integer. The Asmuth-Bloom threshold scheme based on k -compact sequences of co-primes, under the uniform distribution on the secret space, is perfect zero-knowledge.

Security of the Mignotte Threshold Scheme

- The loss of entropy cannot be bounded from above

$$\Delta(y_I) \geq \log \left[\frac{\beta - \alpha - 1}{\frac{\beta - \alpha + \prod_{i \in I} m_i}{\prod_{i \in I} m_i}} \right]$$

- The information rate goes to 0

$$\frac{m_i}{\beta - \alpha - 1} \rightarrow 0 \quad \text{as } m_1 \text{ goes to infinity}$$

- The scheme is not perfect zero-knowledge

$$\sum_{y_I \in \prod_{i \in I} \mathbb{Z}_{m_i}} \left| P(Y_{S,I} = y_I) - P(Y_{S',I} = y_I) \right| = 2$$

Security of Distributive Weighted TAS

Theorem 7

Distributive weighted threshold schemes do not have ideal realizations.

Theorem 8

Distributive weighted threshold schemes are asymptotically perfect if the secret is chosen uniformly from the secret space.

Theorem 9

Distributive weighted threshold schemes are perfect zero-knowledge if the secret is chosen uniformly from the secret space.

Extensions

- **Verifiability** (interactive, non-interactive, public) : allows participants to verify their shares for consistency
- **Proactivity** allows recovering of lost shares by running a share refreshment protocol
- **Anonymity** allows secret reconstruction without knowledge of which participants hold which shares
- **Threshold changeability** allows increasing the threshold parameter after the share distribution phase without further communication between the dealer and the shareholder

Concluding Remarks

1 Review of results

- GRS and Asmuth-Bloom schemes are asymptotically ideal if and only if the schemes are based on 1-compact sequences
- Mignotte scheme does not satisfy none of the security properties
- DWTAS are motivated practically, and satisfy the asymptotic perfectness and perfect zero-knowledge properties

2 “Almost perfect”

3 Convergence rate